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Manh 1, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--:-- SENATE 81993 
THE DESffiABILITY OF A RESO-
LUTION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN 
VIETNAM 
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the problem 
of Vietnam and what we should do in 
achieving a decent resolution of our In-
volvement In that wartorn, unhappy 
land is a problem that looms over the 
thinking, the plans, and the aspirations 
of us all. 
There is no Senator amongst us who 
Is more familiar and knowledgeable con-
cerning this problem t.han Is the senior 
Senator from Montana fMr. MANSFIELD), 
whose knowledge of tl 1e area and whose 
experience with its pc,Jple is great. 
The distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana made a s!ngulaJly perceptive and 
forthright speech at the convocation of 
the University of Indiana a week ago to-
day. In the course of that speech, the 
Senator made the fundamental point 
that--
There Is no obligation to con tlnue to pour 
out the blood f\w.l resources <;>f this Nation 
untll south v .letnam Is made safe for one 
Vietnamese faction or another. 
- The Senator also cited the sad statis-
tL~s when he made his speech a week 
aJo that reveal that there were 543 young 
American men who had been kllled in 
· the preceding 7 days. That was the high-
est weekly total of deaths in the war. To-
day, only 1 week later, we find that we 
have reached the second h.\tTilest total of 
deaths of the war, 470 deaths have oc-
cuned. This brings us to a total of 18,709 
young men killed and 115,144 wounded 
in this unhappy war-a total that is not 
far from the total young men killed and 
wounded in the Korean conflict. 
These mounting casualty figures of 
the United States alone-figures that do 
not include the young Vietnamese men, 
women, and children that have been and 
are being killed in North and South 
Vietnam-! believe show, stress, and un-
derline the importance of the speech of 
the Senator from Montana and make It 
singularly significant today. 
I call the speech to the attention of 
my colleagues and ask unanimous con-
sent that it be printed at this point in 
the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 
as follows: 
AssEsSMEN r IN VIETNAM 
(Rema.rks of Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of 
Montana, at the Indiana University Con-
vocation, Bloomington, Ind., February 23, 
1968) 
The struggle In VIetnam bas turned grim. 
pitiless. and deva.stnt!ng. The casualty fig-
ures a.re staggering. The physical damage ls 
enormous. Men, women, cbtldren, soldiere, 
guerrillas, weapons, machines, cities, towns. 
a.nd villages-all are thrown together In an 
Inferno of destruction. 
It l.s not surprising that the situation bas 
been Interpreted In some quarters as ap-
proa.chlng some sort or climax. It may well 
be, as bas been suggcsteg. the beginning or 
the end. The question Is what beglnn1ng and 
what end? Peace by military vtctory? Peace 
by negotiations? With whom? For what? 
There Is no certainty at tbl.s point a.s to what 
will emerge In VIetnam, or for that matter. 
whether the end of this war Is to be found In 
VIetnam. 
I have no desire. therefore, to Indulge, t<>-
day. In what has become a kind or parlor 
game called "Who's winning In Vietnam?" It 
Is offensive to me, as I know It must be to 
you. to hear this deadly confilct treated as 
some sort of athletic contest. The llvoo of too 
many young Americans are on the line ln 
Vietnam. Too many bewildered men and 
women and children nre being burnt. 
bloodied and broken by this war. Too much Is 
In ruins. Too many lle dead. Vietnam Is not 
a game. There can be no ,vtnners; there are 
only losers and the longer the war persisl.s 
the greater are the losses for all concerned. 
The tragedy of Vietnam constrains us all to 
great sobriety In discussion. There Is little 
point In speculating on the current clashes-
who Is winning and who Is not or what Is 
being won ancl what l.s not. The need 1.s to 
try to detl.ne accurately the chnrneter of the 
present tragedy and, In that way. hopefully, 
to see more clearly what the Interests Of this 
nation will require In the days ahead. 
In this respect, seldom bas a problem pre-
sented greater dlftlcult!es than Vietnam and 
seldom has the need for a solution been 
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(!:renter. A restoration or peace Is Imperative 
tor the welfare of the people o! VIetnam: 
they have been fought over tor so long that. 
In the mllllons. they are torn from their 
anccstraJ places seeking refuge where there 
:s no refuge. For us, too. an honorable solu-
Uon Is of the utmost urgency. The war In 
\'lctnam hns been deeply divisive In Its cr-
f 'C ts on this na tlon. It has d1 ver ted energy 
' .td resources from the great needs or our 
own society The vast dlfficult!es o! the urban 
re". for exam;>le. cry out for attention. 
uut the cry Is barely heard above the din 
<! the distant confllct. 
TI1e n<ltlon's economic equilibrium Is In 
d>nger of being thrown out of kilter by the 
Immense demands or the war In this oon-
nectlon. we have a.lready suffered a slgnH\-
cant degree of Inflation. Furthermore, we 
are confronted with what can only be called 
the embarrassment or having to discourage 
the travel of Americans abroad, because or 
dtmcultles which the war and other foreign 
commitments have Introduced Into the na-
tion's J:>.alance o! payments. 
In our relations with the rest or the world, 
the war In VIetnam ha.. placed formidable 
blocks In the way o! further progress In In-
ternational cooperation . It has brought In 
Its wake new threats to the st.1.blllty of peace, 
116 In the case or the U.S.S. Pueblo Incident 
which may be but the precursor of others. 
In these pinpoints or Instability. moreover. 
there are ever-present threats to the fra.ll 
defenses of the world against nuclear catas-
trophe. 
We did not arrive at thJs situation over-
night. Our involvement In VIetnam Is not 
new born. It we are at a croosroacts. today. 
It Ls but one In a chain or cr<>6&oads which 
extends backwards tor many years. There 
comes to mlnd, tor example, the moment o! 
the French oollapse and the Geneva Con-
ferences of 1954; the a.ssasRtnntlon or Pre<!-
ldent Ngo Dlnh Diem In 1963 and the re-
placement ot civilian government In Saigon 
by a series o! unstable reglnle<~, drawn ever 
more steadily from military sourcC8. ever 
more dependent on the United States 
Finally, there comes to mind the Tonkin Bay 
Incident and the large-scale direct military 
engagement or the United States therel\tter 
In the war In VIetnam. 
In retroepeot It 1s apparent t11.at at each or 
thPse cl'0158roads the Amer1can military In-
volvement hll6 deepened. It Is al80 nppl\rent 
thAt the suocessl ve incron.scs In m1 u ta.ry 
oommltment have led, so far, not to peace. 
but rather to an Increase In oountrr mllltary 
commitment. At the end or 1965, five Sena-
tors Including myself visited VIetnam. In a 
report made public at the oonclualon or our 
study, we stated that we had round that 
this nation's military ef'l'ort was". . preASing 
against a mllltary 81tua:tton which Is. in et!ect. 
open ended. How open Is dependent on the 
extent to which North VIetnam and Its sup-
porters are lvllllng and able to meet Increased 
force by Increased force ... 
How open the war? How able 1\nd willing 
the opposing !OI'CC8 to meet lncrellll<'<l force 
by lncreMed force? 
Our armed forces In VIetnam have In-
creased rrom 23,000 at the beginning or 1065 
to more than half a mllllon todo.y. The bomb-
Ing of North VIetnam by air and hen has 
grown from Apeclflc ret:>llatlon tor specific 
VIet Cong acts of offense <l!';nlnst our forces 
Into the most systematic air and naval bom-
bardment since World Wa.r II The tonnage 
or explosives which has fallen upon VIetnam 
Is already higher than In Korea, or, for that 
matter. In the entire Pnc1flc Theatre during 
World Wa.r II and probably clooe to that 
unloosed In Europe. Moreover, one by one, 
the llmlta.tlons on bomblng-tn.rgets In North 
VIetnam have been removed until a mere 
handful Is all that now stands against ln-
dlscrlmln.ate destruction o! ll!e and property. 
Indeed, the search tor an elusive victory has 
led some to clamor tor that 1ndJscrlmlnnte 
destruction. even to t.lw point or relurnlng 
VIetnam to the SWnc A¥,•·· 
With escalation has coJn<' 1nountlnu 1065<'5 
of life on all sides. U., casualty lists arc 
already longer In the first five or six wc•toks or 
1968 than they were during the entire year 
or 1965. In all of 1965, 1.369 Americans were 
killed. By February 10. this year, 1,674 Amer-
Icans had already been ktlled. Accorcllng to 
reports Issued In S1.lgo:~ on yesterd .. y, 543 
additional Americans we c killed In the last 
seven days, the lllgh<>.st weekly total or tile 
war The over-all figures 110w st.1.nd at 18,239 
deaths and the wounded t Jtal 112,469 Among 
the opposing forces. or C'ourse. there 're re-
ports or astronmlcal Increase· In men killed, 
taken prisoner, or deserting 
I cite these l(rucsome t!gures to Indicate 
the Immense growth In th•· scope or the con-
flict. p:u-tlcull\rly as It hM Involved the Unltt>ct 
States. I flnd It mo't In opproprlate that this 
effort and these greM s.~• rl fices are, In effect, 
called Inadequate In sontP quarters. The fact 
Is that. short or what Pr•me Minister Wilson 
bas called the "lunacy" or nuclear war, this 
nation has made a mn.ss tvc military P!Tort In 
VIetnam. The effort has i>een made by dedi-
cated Americans, ably led, who have r-arrled 
out their orders with cour.t~e and sUil. At 
thJs late date, It ought •t lenst to l!•· clear 
that If the situation 111 VIetnam h tJI not 
changed o.s anticipated. It has not J:>.•rn for 
want of an extraordlna·y mlllt.~ry eff,rt by 
the United St1.tes. Amer c:m forces may well 
have done too much but by no stretch of 
the Lmagtnntlon c:o.n It b said that they have 
done to II ttl e . 
Nevertheless, the real ity Is that the s itua-
tion has not chl\nged as anticipated . At t:te 
time or my last visit t > VIetnam In 1965, 
available estlm:ltes Indicated that 22 pPrcent 
or the population or &>Uth Vll'tnam has 
under control or the N~tlonnl Liberation 
Front, 60 per~nt under government oontrol, 
and 18 percent contested. At the end of lo&t 
year. t11.e Satgon government was reported as 
controlling 67 percent or the population, pre-
sumably n gain of 7 pcrc<'n t. Subet.'ln tl.tl pro-
gress was also reported In the so-called 
pacification program "hich had been 
designed to strengthen and expand Sa.lgon's 
oontrol over t11.c rum! nrc s. 
TI1en came the wave or attacks against 
the cities or South Vlctuam. One can put 
whatever Interpretation one chO<>:'es on these 
recent cln.<hes. What.c\cr el e they may mean, 
they bring Into que$tlon the validity or the 
measures or mllitn.ry progress wlliCh have 
been used In Saigon. They bring Into ques-
tion the etrectlvencss or the Saigon political 
structure. In Its present form . They bring 
Into question the pacification program 
which appears to have g<ll•e the route or at 
lenst a dozen prior contrl\·ed techniques tor 
"winning the people' of VIetnam. They make 
clear, finally, that the cltle• or South VIet-
nam which have heretofore been spared. 
almost by tacit agr•·emcut, have now been 
drawn fully Into t.lw vort..x or the war's ter-
rible devastation. 
Whatever the OUt< orne of the prrsent bat-
tles, the baste mlllt .ry problem Is as It has 
been from the out•el The war remains open-
ended nud escalnt.lou cont1 ~HH'S t.o rise with 
escalation . The Nlltloual I.lberntlon Front 
remains omnipresent, from ·he d<'mllltnrlzed 
7.one at the 17th parallel tc he sou thern tip 
or the peninsula Its regul;t forces and guer-
rillas nrc obviously stN:Iecl to acc<'pt great 
prtvatlou and to mnke en rmous sacrifices. 
The VIet Cong rcp1aln entn•nched and vir-
tually untouched In their traditional strong-
holds--the swamps, paddyftclds and hamlets 
of the Mekong Delta fr '"" whence they nrc 
able to dispatch forces to reinforce units 
which, as Is now oppan·nt, honeycomb 
Saigon and other cl t.les. 
It Is dangerous to presume that either the 
forces of the National Lll>•·rntlon Front or 
North VIetnam nrc nenrlnr the end or the 
rope. Actually, Hanoi has c· tmmltted to the 
wnr Jn the South ron~,JtlrrahJ..· ln.;s than n 
quarter or the f OfCI' o f Gcn<~ral VCJ Nguyen 
Glnp. who Is gener:dly credited with m a,ter-
mlndlng the cu rrent mlllthry strategy In he 
South, And beyolld North Vietnom lies the 
untapped manpower of China nd the EU!' ·I·· 
sources or both Chinn nnd the ~ovlet Unl"'"t ' 
These are some or the rea !I ties wh!ch ::.1 • 
not measW'ed by the computers of "progre,, .. 
In Saigon. These nre some of the realities 
which seem to me to make It Imperative to 
recall the onglnal purposes or the American 
commitment to ~outh VIetnam They were. 
above all else. limited purposes. There Is not 
now and there has never been a mandate to 
take over a war. The comml tment Is to sup-
port not to supplant. 
At the outset, It was not an American re-
sponsibility and It Is not now an American 
responsibility to win n victory ror any par-
ticular group or VIetnamese or to defeat any 
particular group or VIetnamese. Even rf we 
could. It Is not In the lnt.Prests or this nation 
to synthesize a political structure !or South 
VIetnam. That Is not and ought not ever 
to become the fu nctlon or the American 
miLitary command, the American economtRU!. 
administrators. diplomats. political scien-
tists, aid-officials, and others who are 
gathered In VIetnam. The sooner that the 
limits or our commitment are understood by 
nil directly concerned the better for a.ll con-
cerned 
It Is time to recognize that our Immense 
ctrort hne a.lrendy gone n long way to nl ter 
the character of what wna once an Inner 
struggle among VIetnamese. It ts also time 
to recognize thn t whatever we may do, the 
future of VIetnam depends not on us but on 
the VIetnamese themselves. It Is their coun-
try; they live In lt. They will be living In It 
long after we are gone from lt. 
Our responsibility Is to sustain, not to sub-
merge. To strip the VIetnamese struggle of 
Its VIetnamese character. to convert It Into 
a war to be won or lost by this nation. Is to 
detract from Its relevl\nce ooth to the people 
or VIetnam and to the people ot the United 
States. To do so Is to consolidate an Ameri-
can involvement on the Southeast Asian 
mainland or Indefinite duration and obscure 
purposes whose terminus Is not visible-not 
In VIetnam, not In Laos, or In Cambodia In-
deed, It may well be an Involvement which 
Is without exit except In World War III. 
Thts nation Is deeply committed In South 
VIetnam but let us not make the mistake 
or Interpreting that commitment as com-
pelling us--In the name of victory or what-
ever-to see to It that every last member 
ot the NLF Is either dulled, dead, captive. or 
ln flight. That course leads not to an ending 
but to an endless succession of violent be-
ginnings. 
An Inextricable Involvement of American 
forces In VIetnam may meet the needs of 
some but It accords neither with the In-
terests or the United States or the people 
or VIetnam. In this connection. President 
Johnson has repeatedly stated that this na-
tion's objective Is " .. only that the peo-
ple of South Vletnnm be allowed to guide 
their own country In their own way" He 
has stated that he l• willing to move at nny 
time In negotiations which might bring 
about that rceult. He has stated that we are 
prepared to move out lock. stock. and barrel 
In n mn.tter or months after a satisfactory 
settlement Is nchlevcct . 
It should be clear, therefore. to all con-
cerned- Americans and VIetnamese In Wash-
lngbon. In Saigon. and In Hanoi and to 
whomever, wherever- that that Is the accu-
rate measure of this nl\tlon's commitment. 
There Is no obligation to continu e to pour out 
the blood and resources or this nation until 
South VIetnam Is made safe for one VIet-
namese fnctlon or another. On the con-
trary, there Is an obligation to the people 
ot the United States to conserve that blood 
and those resources and, to tile people or 
VIetnam. there Is an obligation to avoid the 
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